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Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Michael Comstock 
 
Putin scores high marks with commercial interests 
One of President Vladimir Putin's goals has been to foster the economic recovery 
of Russian business. Now, whether or not this is taking place is not entirely 
relevant to Putin as long as the larger "oligarchies" that potentially may breed 
opposition to the Kremlin are kept docile. Recent analyses by foreign experts 
indicate that this goal may have been achieved.  
 
As Russian business recovers, it expands abroad, and new markets open. This 
process can be judged indirectly by the volume of business handled by 
commercial law firms, such as White & Chase. In coordinating commercial laws 
between two countries, these firms constitute an effective control point in the 
network of global business. Following Russia's economic collapse in 1998, these 
firms were decimated. They have been steadily recovering since, and point to the 
Russian president as one reason for their recovery. In the words of one White & 
Chase managing partner, "Since Mr. Putin came to power, the level of political 
stability and corresponding economic stability has allowed our clients and 
therefore ourselves to function with greater scope and efficiency." (THE 
MOSCOW TIMES, 23 Jan 03; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) The long-
term stability of Putin's policies has yet to be determined and may prove to be as 
transitory as the period ending in 1998, but in the short term at least, he has 
made the appropriate decisions, thus benefiting his own political base. 
 
Trouble in St. Petersburg 
A newly formed bloc of political parties within St. Petersburg's local legislature 
has charged that the Kremlin is actively interfering with the regional government 
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in order to set the stage for the 2004 presidential elections. As explained by a 
member of the new Yediny bloc in St. Petersburg, Vladimir Yeremenko, "there is 
a political movement to put a new governor in place [before the] presidential 
elections, and the center of this pressure comes from within the presidential 
administration." (THE ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 24 Jan 03; via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database) The Kremlin reportedly would prefer a governor more 
supportive of Putin at the head of such a critical region. The Yediny bloc 
considers this to be outside interference and has coalesced specifically to 
combat it. The bloc controls a sufficient margin to prevent the two-thirds majority 
necessary for the legislature to overturn a veto by the governor, and enough 
power to require the Kremlin-backed parties to negotiate with it on important 
matters relating to appointments and funding within the legislature. This activity 
does not constitute a full-scale rebellion against Putin's control, but rather a 
political tactic to enable the bloc to negotiate with the Kremlin for future benefits. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Scott Fleeher 
 
Grigory Pasko -- free, but not forgotten 
Significant pressure from media sources and human rights groups appears to 
have culminated in success with regards to the case of the environmental 
journalist Grigory Pasko. As predicted (in the previous issue of The NIS 
Observed), Pasko was released from a hard labor prison camp in Vladivostok on 
Thursday, 23 January. (AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 23 Jan 03; via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database) 
 
The Pasko saga began with his initial arrest and sentencing for alleged 
disclosure of state secrets in November of 1997. As the case progressed, the 
"state secrets" alleged by the FSB turned out to be scientific data that were 
readily available in the public domain. Without regard for the actual sensitivity (or 
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lack thereof) of the documents in question, Pasko eventually was sentenced for 
treason to a four-year prison term. Following his final conviction, Pasko was 
offered an amnesty, which he rejected flatly as amounting to an admission of 
guilt. (THE NIS OBSERVED, 22 Jan 03) 
 
Following his release for good behavior by a local court in Ussuriisk, Pasko 
stated, "I am overjoyed that at last I am free, and I thank all those who supported 
me during all these years." He indicated that his release would not end the 
controversy regarding his arrest and incarceration. "I still have a battle ahead of 
me to prove my innocence," Pasko announced. The newly free journalist added 
that he would present an appeal to the Russian Supreme Court, and vowed to 
put his case before the European Court of Human Rights, if necessary. 
(AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 23 Jan 03; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
It is unlikely that an appeal to the Russian Supreme Court will have a favorable 
result; the court previously had upheld his conviction. However, continued 
vigilance by human rights groups such as Amnesty International and the 
Glasnost Defense Foundation is certain to sustain a considerable amount of 
attention to his case. Sergei Grigoriants of the Glasnost Defense Foundation 
summed up his organization's position: "This is excellent news. But it is important 
that the sentence is quashed... [R]ecently, there have not been any more cases 
such as this fabricated by the FSB. Let's hope the authorities understand their 
futility." (AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 23 Jan 03; via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) 
 
Prosecutors for the state continue to maintain that Pasko is guilty, and have not 
ruled out an appeal of their own. In a final assault on the truth, an official of the 
justice ministry posed yet another attack on Pasko and his innocence. In an 
interview with Interfax, the official indicated (incorrectly) that only prisoners who 
have admitted their guilt are eligible for parole (as opposed to amnesty). 
(AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 23 Jan 03; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
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'Spymania' -- old tactics, new name 
Together with the conclusion of one "act" of the Pasko drama, a second, yet no 
less visible, series of blunders by the FSB continues to unfold. "Spymania" has 
arrived in Russia. Is this a new phenomenon -- or simply another name for the 
status quo?  
 
During a recent press conference organized by the Helsinki Group on human 
rights, prominent Russian scientists condemned state officials (and indirectly the 
FSB) for "creating serious problems for Russia's scientific community and 
damaging the country's prospects as a center of research." (AGENCE FRANCE-
PRESSE, 30 Jan 03; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) The scientists 
characterized recent prosecutions and trials of several prominent researchers as 
part of the "Soviet mentality" which has led to increased trepidation that research 
in "sensitive" areas might lead the security services to suspect scientists of 
espionage. (AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 30 Jan 03; via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) 
 
Meeting in Moscow, the scientists (including two members of the prestigious 
Russian Academy of Arts and Sciences) pointed to the case of their colleague, 
Igor Sutyagin, who has been in jail since 1999 while awaiting trial on charges of 
passing secrets to the United States. (AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 30 Jan 03; 
via ISI Emerging Markets Database) A trial date has yet to be set. If "proven" 
guilty, Sutyagin could face between 12 and 20 years in prison; however, at the 
current pace, Sutyagin will have served any putative sentence well before he is 
formally indicted. 
 
Do as you like, not as I say 
In an address to a large gathering of FSB officials in Moscow, President Vladimir 
Putin stressed that the priorities for today's security service have not really 
changed. In theory, the principles of "protecting the state and society from 
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outside and internal threats" (synonymous with humanitarian aid workers, 
journalists and Russian scientists), "observing the rights of citizens and 
democratic values" (Pasko, Sutyagin,...?), and "maintaining Russia's national 
security" as enumerated by Putin are by no means new planks in the FSB 
platform. (ITAR-TASS, 31 Jan 03; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
Regrettably, little has changed over the years. A 1997 assessment by J. Michael 
Waller of the American Foreign Policy Council contained many parallels with the 
current exploits of the security services. Waller listed the following abrogations of 
the security service's constitutional mandate to "safeguard the human rights of all 
citizens of the Russian Federation": harassment, defamation, legal as well as 
extrajudicial persecution of critics; curtailed freedom of the press; restrictions on 
religious freedom; torture; and murder. All of these issues were supposed to 
have been addressed under the auspices of a framework for change referred to 
as the "Bakatin Reforms." (PERSPECTIVE, September-October 1997) While the 
FSB and other arms of the security services unquestionably have undergone 
numerous name changes and bureaucratic reorganizations over recent years, 
the reform goals remain as elusive today as they were in 1997. 
 
Too little, too late 
Alas, Putin's recent emphasis on humanitarian treatment and respect for human 
rights may have been reintroduced and reemphasized to his colleagues of the 
FSB just a few weeks too late for practical application. The confidential personal 
information of millions of Russian mobile telephone subscribers reportedly was 
"leaked" from a subscriber database, raising yet another controversy for the FSB. 
The information --which includes name, date of birth, passport number, 
residence, and employment data (among other personal details) -- reportedly is 
being sold in Moscow (as a database) for 2,000 rubles or less. (WPS, 29 Jan 03; 
via ISI Emerging Markets Database) According to Mobile TeleSystems (MTS), 
the confidential customer information in question may have been leaked through 
the FSB.  
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Access to the MTS database was granted to the security services during the 
Dubrovka theater hostage drama in Moscow; the FSB used the data after 
monitoring outgoing mobile telephone calls from the besieged theater. (In fact, for 
several years the FSB has been monitoring electronic traffic through the 
compulsory installation of the SORM program in all Internet servers.) In reference 
to the compromised data, Eva Prokofieva, a press secretary for MTS, stated, "In 
compliance with the law, operators must provide security agencies with 
confidential information about subscribers. We could not refuse to disclose this 
information to the FSB." (WPS, 29 Jan 03; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
Of course, that does not mean that the security service necessarily was the 
culprit selling the information. As an unnamed expert on information protection 
(also from MTS) explained, "An information leak through the security agencies is 
quite probable, however, I would also consider another possibility. Customer data 
could have leaked through some of the company's employees, or through a 
break into the MTS database through outside channels." (WPS, 29 Jan 03; via 
ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
Conclusive evidence as to who exactly released the confidential information from 
the MTS database has yet to be presented. Still, the fact remains that the FSB 
has access to the data, by default moving its agents to the top of the suspect list 
as the investigation continues. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Ansel Stein 
 
Who's in charge? 
Speaking at a St. Petersburg conference on "Globalization and National Self-
Determination," Russian political scientist Sergei Kurginyan declared last week 
that "the integration of Russia into the international community and the 
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preservation of Russia's integrity as a state are mutually exclusive goals." His 
views were bolstered by those of St. Petersburg State University Professor 
Aleksandr Kuropyatnik, who declared at the conference: "If we strive for a global 
community, we will lose Russian values." (RFE/RL SECURITY AND 
TERRORISM WATCH, 22 Jan 03) Kurginyan and Kuropyatnik's concern about 
the threat of the global community is one thing, but another is the tendency to 
define Russian foreign policy in anti-US terms, as illustrated, to some extent, by 
the Iraq crisis. This situation is somewhat reminiscent of Cold War-era Soviet 
policy, but there is a significant difference: Earlier, countries such as Iraq had 
their foreign policy conform with the interests of the Soviet Union. The dynamic 
has changed. 
 
In the past few months Russia has sent its representatives around the world, 
announcing that Russian foreign policy and that of the host countries in question 
conform in entirety, especially with regard to America's most important diplomatic 
moves. The question now is whether states such as Iraq, China, Iran and France 
are bending their foreign policy to conform to that of Russia or vice versa? Even 
prior to Hans Blix's report to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 
Moscow declared that international inspectors should continue working in Iraq 
regardless of their findings. A "high-ranking Russian diplomat" asserted that "an 
inspector's report cannot be the justifying reason for using force [against Iraq]. 
There must be no such actions at all." Regarding accusations that Iraq is 
concealing weapons of mass destruction, the source noted that "Moscow is not 
inclined to exaggerate the significance of this declaration. After all, it is only one 
source of information for the fulfillment of the UNMOVIC's mandate, although it is 
an important one... If Iraq's declaration has some blank spaces, they must be 
filled in patiently and consistently." (INTERFAX, 1022 GMT, 23 Jan 03; FBIS-
SOV-2003-0123, via World News Connection)  
 
If Russia will not base its decisions on UNMOVIC reporting, what will form the 
basis of its foreign policy? Had Hans Blix made a declaration favorable to Iraq, of 
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course, Russia's stance might have been different. Since Blix's report contained 
serious criticisms of Iraq, Russia simply is lining up with France and others to 
avoid compelling Iraq to disarm. Why else would Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov 
have spent the period leading up to the passage of Resolution 1441 declaring 
that "several months of work will be more than enough to get a final result. It may 
also be discovered...that such weapons are not to be found there..."? 
(RZECZPOSPOLITA, 25 Sep 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0925, via World News 
Connection) Inspectors have been active in Iraq for more than two months; now 
Ivanov asserts that they simply need more time.  
 
In addition, Moscow has argued that there are more pressing diplomatic issues 
facing the world than confronting Iraq. Addressing a special session of the UNSC 
which discussed ways to fight terrorism, Ivanov declared that unilateral moves 
against Iraq could "endanger the unity of the anti-terrorist coalition." (ITAR-TASS, 
2006 GMT, 20 Jan 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0121, via World News Connection) 
Russia is bending its foreign policy to conform to that of a petty third-world 
dictator, against its own best interests. Russia might suffer more from leaving the 
"anti-terrorist coalition" than the latter would suffer from Russia's departure. 
Moscow has been allowed something of a free hand concerning its operations in 
Chechnya and enjoyed "flattering words" from American officials at the recent 
World Economic Forum in Davos; moreover, its stature as a world power has 
been raised by US efforts to maintain the anti-terror coalition. (ROSSIYSKAYA 
GAZETA, 28 Jan 03; FBIS-NES-2003-0128, via World News Connection) It 
remains to be seen how Russia will react to America's presentation of data 
concerning Iraq's violations of its international commitments. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Kate Martin 
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'Eagle'-eyed oversight? 
The US government recently expressed its concern for the future of a free press 
in Russia. (INTERFAX, 1058 GMT, 20 Jan 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0120, via World 
News Connection) However, the caution came not because of apparent FSB 
incursions into what the media could cover without being charged with treason, 
not because of attacks on journalists in the field or in their offices, and not 
because of the gradual coopting of the press by the government. Rather, US 
Department of State spokesman Richard Boucher's assertion that the US was 
closely watching the situation in Russia was spurred by the dismissal from the 
Gazprom-Media board of American Boris Jordan - whose appointment to the 
board, and as NTV general director, nearly two years ago was never expected 
particularly to further the cause of freedom of the press. 
 
Indeed, it appears that the very lack of expectations may have been the 
motivation for his ouster. As the government edged out previous media owner 
Vladimir Gusinsky in the Spring of 2001, Jordan replaced Yevgeni Kiselev at 
NTV, causing several journalists to quit in protest against what they saw as an 
attack on media freedom. If, as many assumed, Jordan originally was appointed 
because the government anticipated he would ensure the station's support of 
official activity, then NTV coverage of the October hostage drama in Moscow 
must have infuriated the powers-that-be. Given the timing of Jordan's ouster, no 
other explanation seems as likely. 
 
The board's decision to dismiss Jordan came just four months after the two 
parties had signed a three-year contract, giving some weight to the notion that 
whatever caused the dismissal, it was not the reason given by Jordan's 
replacement on the Gazprom-Media board, Alexander Dybal. Dybal, who served 
as chairman of that board, cited differing "views on corporate management and 
business development strategy." (INTERFAX, 1250 GMT, 17 Jan 03; FBIS-SOV-
2003-0117, via World News Connection)  
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While remaining diplomatic, Jordan responded by pointing to the editorial and 
economic successes NTV could claim during his tenure. "When I headed NTV at 
the invitation of Gazprom, I decided I would stick to two main principles: 
independent editing policy and effectiveness of NTV as a business. ... When we 
started managing NTV, it was on the verge of financial bankruptcy. ... In the 
course of these two years we succeeded in turning NTV into a successful 
business," Jordan said at a news conference. (INTERFAX, 1338 GMT, 21 Jan 
03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0121, via World News Connection) He refused to comment 
on speculation concerning possible political motivations behind his dismissal. 
 
Such speculation, not surprisingly, was rampant in media and political circles. 
While many individuals ascribed Jordan's ouster to NTV's coverage of the 
hostage drama, others saw broader political machinations. Much of the analysis, 
however, seemed to owe more to widely held beliefs that Moscow does not 
encourage press freedom. Igor Yakovenko, secretary general of the Russian 
Union of Journalists, charged that the move was due to a government desire to 
tighten control of the media. His charges were echoed by Duma MP Boris 
Nemtsov, who claimed that such actions were meant to "[establish] total 
censorship, primarily in the electronic mass media," before parliamentary and 
presidential elections. Alexei Venediktov, editor-in-chief of Ekho Moskvy, also 
saw a shadowy political hand behind the ouster. "It seems to me that this 
dismissal is politically motivated, and it has nothing to do with NTV's coverage of 
the events at Dubrovka. It's possible that there are some other factors as well, 
but I know nothing about them," Venediktov said. (INTERFAX, 1709 GMT, 17 
Jan 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0117, via World News Connection)  
 
Not all members of the media saw sinister dealings; however, their own 
motivations also might be suspect. Dmitri Biryukov, president and co-owner of 
the publishing house Sem Dnei, which is part of the Gazprom-Media holding, 
said he "disagree[d] that Jordan's dismissal is politically motivated. It is 
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absolutely an economic decision, which is based on the Gazprom-Media board's 
calculations." (INTERFAX, 1709 GMT, 17 Jan 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0117, via 
World News Connection) 
 
Shortly thereafter, Biryukov was appointed first deputy general of Gazprom-
Media. (ITAR-TASS, 2051 GMT, 29 Jan 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0129, via World 
News Connection) As for NTV having an independent editorial policy, the future 
does not look rosy, although the press releases may continue to be: Jordan's 
replacement as general director is Nikolai Senkevich, previously deputy head of 
Gazprom's information policy department. (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 23 Jan 03) 
 
POLLS 
Present cloudy, future murky 
The results of recent polls indicate that, not surprisingly, it's no fun to be on the 
bottom tier of Russian society. While the Kremlin busies itself with international 
affairs, life for many ordinary persons seems increasingly hopeless. 
 
In addition to the heating crisis afflicting numerous regions, discussed in the 
previous NIS Observed, many Russians are facing a healthcare crisis. According 
to a poll by the All-Russian Center for Public Opinion Research, 71 percent of 
respondents said it is impossible to obtain good medical care in the country. 
Whether this is a new situation was less clear: 42 percent noted a decrease in 
the quality of care, while 37 percent reported there had been no change. 
(INTERFAX, 1518 GMT, 21 Jan 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0121, via World News 
Connection) Certainly, low standards of living are affecting more and more 
Russians. The Ministry of Education and Social Development recently reported 
that in the past few years, "mortality from unnatural causes linked to 
unfavourable social conditions has continued to rise." (ITAR-TASS, 1238 GMT, 
21 Jan 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0121, via World News Connection) The ministry 
noted an increase in deaths from alcohol poisoning (by 34 percent) as well as 
suicide and homicide (up 9 percent) in 2000-2002. 
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Another survey indicates that few perceive the level of hopelessness likely to be 
alleviated by political parties, whose activities are increasingly ignored by the 
general population. A poll by the Public Opinion Fund indicated that not many 
Russians maintain any interest in the activity of political parties - over 80 percent 
of respondents were unable to name any party action that caught their attention 
during the week. (ITAR-TASS, 1547 GMT, 24 Jan 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0124, via 
World News Connection) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Steve Kwast and Dan Rozelle 
 
Moscow is flirting with nuclear disaster 
On 15 January, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree that cut back 
the list of nuclear technologies and equipment banned for export. This move 
opened the floodgates for "rogue states" to purchase enormous amounts of dual-
use technologies directly related to developing military nuclear capability. The 
atomic energy ministry points to the increased international demand for Russian 
high technology as a reason for the decree and claims the technologies in 
question have become irrelevant for the country's security. (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 
22 Jan 03) 
 
Putin's policy flies directly in the face of the current world terrorism threat and the 
need for all states to tighten the flow of technologies helpful to terrorists. The 
development of nuclear weapons has been the goal of many terrorist 
organizations. This latest action makes it that much easier for them to get their 
hands on such capability. It is further proof that Moscow is willing to do almost 
anything to sell equipment and knowledge for cash. It also highlights the Russian 
economic crisis that is at the root of these policies.  
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Just one day before President Putin signed that decree, Foreign Ministry 
spokesman Aleksandr Yakovenko announced that Moscow and Damascus had 
reached an accord under which Russia will assist in the construction of a 
nuclear-power plant and a nuclear-powered desalination plant in Syria. 
(FINANCIAL TIMES, 16 Jan 03; via Lexis-Nexis) That announcement 
engendered such international outrage at Russia's flagrant release of nuclear 
information that Moscow made hasty denials and pledged it would not help Syria 
build a nuclear reactor. According to Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, "We 
are not even thinking about selling a nuclear reactor to Syria." He went on to 
acknowledge that Syria is a base for terrorist activity, and that eventually the 
weapons that reach Hezbollah through Syria will end up with the Chechens. "We 
will not give any weapons that can be a possible danger to Israel, which can be 
used against Israel in an attack, only weapons for Syria's own defense," he 
added. (THE JERUSALEM POST, 20 Jan 03; via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
Despite Moscow's assurance that no nuclear reactor would be built with Russian 
assistance, two years of negotiations and coordination between the governments 
in science, technologies and the training of scientists leave open the fear that 
some damage already has been done. In this field, information alone can be as 
deadly as the weapon itself. (ITAR-TASS, 1422 GMT, 14 Jan 02; FBIS-SOV-
2003-0114, via World News Connection) 
 
It would be wise for the international community to monitor closely Moscow's 
proliferation of technologies and information surrounding nuclear capability. The 
money it brings home to Russia is minor compared to the damage it could cause 
if such information reaches terrorists. 
 
Russian military activity is on the rise, but it's not helping reform 
Military troops are on the move in Russia. From fighter aircraft flying more hours, 
to increased numbers of exercises, to the Navy floating ships in every sea, the 
Russian military is moving back to levels of activity not seen in years. 
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On 22 January, Admiral Vladimir Kuroedov, commander-in-chief of the Russian 
Navy, said that the 2003 defense budget makes it possible to activate combat 
training for practically all fleets. "First and foremost, this concerns the Pacific 
Fleet because it must conduct a full-fledged exercise this year." (KRASNAYA 
ZVEZDA, 18 Jan 03; WPS Defense and Security, via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) 
 
The same dynamic also is seen in the Air Force. The commander of the Air 
Force, Colonel-General Vladimir Mikhailov, said the annual flight hours of 
Russian pilots would increase by 68 percent. That amounts to 25 annual flight 
hours for fighter and long-range aviation crews, and about 30 annual hours for 
attack airplane crews. (ITAR-TASS, 1525 GMT, 15 Jan 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-
0115, via World News Connection) 
 
However, Russia's military leadership is falling into an old habit pattern in the way 
this new money is being used. Russia has lost significant combat capability over 
the past years because of insufficient funds for training. Now that the money is 
starting to appear, military leaders have reverted to earlier operating patterns. 
Russian senior officers need to ask themselves if this is the best use of the 
money. If Putin's goal is to reform and modernize the Russian military, then this 
infusion of funds shouldn't be spent entirely on exercising and operating 
equipment from the Cold War. A larger proportion should be used to put in place 
new weapon systems and to exercise new capabilities. 
 
The Russian Air Force is a perfect example. Last year the force modernized only 
12 warplanes. This year the target is 20. (ITAR-TASS, 1132 GMT, 16 Jan 03; 
FBIS-SOV-2003-0116, via World News Connection) Rather, most of the new 
money Putin is giving his Air Force is being spent on increasing the flying time of 
old jets. Those jets are aging systems that cannot meet Russia's national security 
needs of tomorrow. 
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The same is true with the Russian Navy. Increased funding is being overspent on 
operating a Cold War Navy using the same old methods. Instead, the money 
could be re-apportioned to give the Navy capabilities to fight current and future 
world threats. The chief of the Russian Navy Staff seems to understand. "The 
21st century is the epoch of the world's oceans, and many countries are 
spearheading their policies toward a greater use of oceanic resources," said 
Admiral Viktor Kravchenko. "Those policies require much strength, and the US 
and NATO are quickly building up the striking power of their navies. They are 
now capable of delivering strikes at targets 250 kilometers inside continents, 
even though their ships and submarines may be cruising outside the 600-mile 
zone. In the wake of this situation, development of the Navy must become a 
priority for Russia in the coming few years." (ITAR-TASS, 1444 GMT, 18 Jan 03; 
FBIS-SOV-2003-0118, via World News Connection) 
 
Despite that farsightedness, however, it is clear that Russian generals and 
admirals are reverting to old habits in the way they are spending Putin's hard-
earned cash for military reform, showcasing yet another aspect of the military 
that warrants careful examination. An internal review of Moscow's distribution of 
military funds is necessary if President Putin and Defense Minister Ivanov want 
reform anytime soon. 
 
Russia's hollow military 
It's no surprise to astute observers that the Russian military faces a number of 
growing problems. Equipment and weapons consist mostly of aging, low-
technology pieces. The Army is fighting a sustained, bloody conflict in Chechnya 
while the Navy continues to deal with the embarrassing legacy of the Kursk 
disaster. And all the armed forces possess some form of nearly unmanageable 
stockpiles of chemical, nuclear or biological weapons. While any of these 
situations alone is cause for concern, the most significant (and, recently, most 
visible) are the living and working conditions of service members. Without a 
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sustained, focused effort to counter their present poor treatment, Russia faces a 
subtle implosion of its military and the loss of an effective fighting force. Three 
key indicators provide a measure of the harsh lives faced by those serving in 
Russia's armed forces that, when combined, may result in a breakdown in loyalty 
and discipline. 
 
CRIME 
The last edition of The NIS Observed noted that Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov 
declared in his State of the Armed Forces speech that, while there is still room for 
improvement, illegal activity has decreased. When one looks at the raw numbers 
available, it is clear that they have nowhere to go but down.  
 
In statistics that would be shocking to any Western armed forces, Military 
Prosecutor-General Alexander Savekov said that his office exposed 
approximately 80,000 violations of law committed both by rank-and-file personnel 
and by military officials. This number includes criminal charges of hazing against 
more than 2,000 servicemen in the first 11 months of 2002 and 1,300 officers 
who were punished for maltreating their subordinates. Other equally astounding 
numbers are that 800 soldiers and officers were murdered by other 
servicemembers; 1,200 servicemen died from actions other than combat. In 
addition, military prosecutors have found and returned to depots 1,500 units of 
small arms, 300,000 rounds of ammunition and 1,200 kilograms of explosives 
over the past three years. (ITAR-TASS, 1402 GMT, 10 Jan 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-
0110, via World News Connection) 
 
Despite these dire figures, Savekov asserted that the Army situation was better 
than that of the country in general with a crime rate 2 to 2.5 times below the 
national average. "The situation is under control, despite certain violations of the 
law," he said. (KOMMERSANT, 11 Jan 03; What the Papers Say, via ISI Defense 
and Security Database) 
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DRUG ABUSE 
Feeding the crisis is the growing problem of drugs and drug addiction. Between 
1995 and 2000, the number of conscription-age men declared unfit for service 
due to drug addiction quadrupled -- from 4,700 to 20,900. Despite the military's 
efforts to prevent drug users from serving, their numbers are steadily increasing. 
It is now estimated that one-fifth of the 400,000 men conscripted annually are 
drug addicts. (ROSSIYA, 14 Nov 02; What the Papers Say, via ISI Defense and 
Security Database) The example of the North Caucasus Military District serves to 
illustrate the drug problem: In 2000, 18% of conscripts from the district had used 
drugs; in 2001, the number had grown to 33%, and in 2002 it was nearly 40%. 
While the figures stated here certainly are not representative of all districts, the 
rise in drug usage is mirrored elsewhere. 
 
With rising drug abuse rates come higher levels of crime. The FSB has charged 
that organized crime groups are using military personnel to transport illegal 
drugs, often with vehicles belonging to the security forces. The theft of narcotics 
from military clinics and storehouses also is becoming increasingly common. In 
one instance over 3,500 pills and about 600 syringes filled with a potent painkiller 
were stolen from a storehouse in Stavropol. Even the defense ministry is not 
immune: Students in the ministry's institutions are being implicated more 
frequently in drug dealing. 
 
The danger posed by this situation to the country as a whole has not gone 
unnoticed. The deputy chairman of the Duma defense committee, Eduard 
Vorobiev, says the problem is serious "because the spread of drug addiction now 
poses a threat not only to public health and the economy, but to the nation's 
security and capacity to defend itself." (NEZAVISIMOE VOENNOE OBOZRENIE, 
30 Oct 02; What the Papers Say, via ISI Russian Political Monitor Database)  
 
MASS DESERTIONS 
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The most visible problem faced by Russia's military over the course of the last 
several months has been desertion by large groups of soldiers. Individual 
desertions are frequent among Russia's 1.1 million members. Many are 
conscripts forced to serve two years in the Army (three in the Navy), often under 
brutal conditions and subject to severe bullying and violence by officers and other 
soldiers. (AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 5 Jan 02; via ISI Defense and Security 
Database) According to members of the human rights organization, the 
Committee of Soldiers' Mothers, 740 soldiers sought assistance after deserting in 
2002. However, of late, larger-than-usual groups of soldiers have deserted. 
Some of the most publicized incidents: 
 
On 18 October 2002, 18 soldiers deserted from an emergencies ministry military 
unit, saying officers of the unit beat them with iron rods. The soldiers went to the 
Committee of Soldiers' Mothers and detailed their ordeal, showing the bruises 
that reportedly resulted from the beatings. The Military Prosecutor's Office, while 
unable to explain the bruises, claimed that none of the soldiers was beaten; 
however, one claim by the committee that the soldiers were being used as a free 
labor force was acknowledged indirectly: "Yes, soldiers worked at enterprises 
(including private companies) and farms in order to get food for privates. If we 
had offended them, they would have written a complaint to Emergencies Minister 
Sergei Shoigu...." (TRIBUNA, 22 Oct 02; What the Papers Say, via ISI Defense 
and Security Database) 
 
Sixteen soldiers also approached the committee on 3 December after deserting. 
All belonged to the Taman Motorized Division of the Moscow Military District. In 
this case all of the soldiers voluntarily returned to their unit after their request was 
met to have their apparently excessively cruel commander removed. (WHAT 
THE PAPERS SAY, 10 Jan 03; via ISI Defense and Security Database) 
 
Thirteen conscripts ran away from a unit in the Sverdlovsk region on 19 
December. The causes in this case apparently were ethnic harassment and 
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physical abuse by other conscripts. The "escapees" were returned to their unit 
after a search but will not face charges since they were gone less than 48 hours. 
The Military Prosecutor's Office has since pressed charges against the abusive 
conscripts and claimed that unit commanders were disciplined. 
(PODROBNOSTI, 23 Dec 02; What the Papers Say, via ISI Defense and 
Security Database) 
 
Twenty-four soldiers of the Federal Railroads Service Force left their unit in the 
Leningrad region without permission on 4 January. The Committee of Soldiers' 
Mothers says that it received over 70 complaints in 2002 from soldiers serving in 
this particular unit. (INTERFAX, 0716 GMT, 5 Jan 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0105, via 
World News Connection) Understandably, the desertion is being disputed. The 
soldiers say they were being beaten by the officers; however, military spokesman 
from the Railroad Forces claim the soldiers were injured and deserted after 
drinking heavily and resisting officers' attempts to control them. (EKHO 
MOSKVY, 1500 GMT, 5 Jan 03; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Defense and Security 
Database) 
 
Individually, the desertions described above can be treated as isolated failures of 
mid-level leadership by Russia's military. But collectively, along with the rise in 
drug use and crime, they are the symptoms of a widespread and growing void of 
able, ethical and committed leadership -- the same leadership that will be 
expected to shepherd reform of Russia's military from a conscripted force 
focused on large-scale war to a contract (volunteer) force designed to fight small-
scale conflicts and terrorism. Regardless of what form Russia's military 
eventually takes, there is but one key to a successful military: well-trained, 
disciplined and motivated servicemembers who believe that they and their 
families are, and will be, well treated. It appears that Russia's military leaders 
have their work cut out for them. 
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Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Nadeza Kinsky and Scott Fleeher 
 
UKRAINE 
East-West 
In January, Ukraine continued to balance its ties to the West and to Russia. 
About 1,000 anti-Russian protesters greeted the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS) summit in Kyiv on 28-29 January with calls for an official Russian 
apology for Ukrainian suffering under Soviet rule and the dismissal of the 
Russian ambassador to Ukraine, who has refused to issue such an apology. The 
ambassador's reasoning had been that Russians also suffered under Soviet rule, 
and that one must differentiate between the Soviet Union and Russia.  
 
The summit itself, however, was an affirmation of Russian-Ukrainian ties. One 
major event was Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma's appointment as the new 
president of the CIS (proposed by Russian President Vladimir Putin). This 
appointment, first suggested by Putin in November, originally failed due to 
opposition by three member states. It is particularly controversial since Ukraine is 
not actually a member of the CIS -- the Verkhovna Rada never ratified the 1994 
CIS Charter. While Ukraine has described itself as an associate member of the 
CIS throughout the last decade, Kuchma pointed out in December that no such 
status actually exists in the CIS; he failed to clarify what this means for Ukraine's 
status in the organization.  
 
The Ukrainian opposition decried the appointment, alleging that Moscow is 
building its ties with Ukraine with an eye to the presidential election in 2004, and 
scouting for a potential pro-Russian candidate to support. Oleksandr Moroz 
called the appointment "prearranged"; Petro Symoneko commented that "This is 
nothing more than a political farce aimed at prolonging Kuchma's political life for 
a certain time." Yuriy Kostenko of Our Ukraine linked the appointment quite 
explicitly to Russian interests in Ukraine: "This election means only one thing: 
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President Putin has obtained additional political leverage to exert more influence 
on Ukraine." (FINANCIAL TIMES INFORMATION, 30 Jan 03; BBC Monitoring, 
via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
The CIS meeting and presidency were not the only causes for Ukrainian-Russian 
relations being in the news. Before the summit opened, Putin and Kuchma 
signed the border treaty between Ukraine and Russia, finishing a four-year 
process of delineating the 2,063-kilometer land boundary. Both parties stressed 
that this would not separate the states, but rather draw them closer together, 
proving that there were no clashes and misunderstandings in Russian and 
Ukrainian interests. Putin commented that the agreement is "a compromise 
solution that does not call into doubt the national interests of the two countries." 
(ITAR-TASS, 28 Jan 03; BBC Monitoring, via Lexis-Nexis) The maritime border, 
namely the Sea of Azov, still remains disputed. 
 
The final reason for President Putin's presence in the Ukrainian capital was the 
opening of the "Year of Russia" in Ukraine. This continues the "Year of Ukraine" 
initiative held in Russia last year. While presidential speeches hailed the mutual 
understanding and cooperation of the two countries, it has been noted that there 
is little substance to the celebration. Once again, oppositional newspapers and 
lawmakers have pointed to Russia's efforts to increase its presence in Ukraine in 
the run-up to the presidential election, and Moscow's desire for a pro-Russian 
president to take over from Kuchma in 2004. Putin certainly did his best to 
emphasize the need for Ukrainian-Russian friendship in his many speeches held 
across Kyiv during the last days of January. As he explained during a visit to 
Shevchenko National University, "Russia and Ukraine can achieve success only 
if they rely on each other. Sovereignty must not hamper our relations." (ITAR-
TASS, 28 Jan 03; BBC Monitoring, via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
Immediately preceding Putin's visit, with its affirmations of Russian-Ukrainian 
relations, was the publication of a Ukraine-NATO Membership Action Plan 
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(MAP), outlining concrete goals to be achieved towards NATO membership. 
(Text is available at www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b021122a.htm.) While the 
publication itself is another affirmation of Ukraine's desire to develop closer ties 
to the West, it has been widely criticized from within Ukraine for its vague 
wording. Moreover, the MAP is accompanied by a document, outlining the 
objectives for the coming year, which remains inaccessible to the general public 
and the media. This second document has been described as unclear and 
unrealistic. In addition, a poll undertaken in December shows a decline in 
Ukrainian public support and trust in NATO over the past year. The decline is not 
surprising, given negative press coverage during and after the NATO summit in 
Prague in November. The course towards NATO still seems to be rather 
tentative, though it is certainly not being abandoned.  
 
BELARUS 
Best friends again? 
Russian President Putin not only has been visiting Ukraine recently. He attended 
the Russia-Belarus Union Supreme Council meeting in Minsk on 20 January 
together with Belarus President Alyaksandr Lukashenka. The meeting began the 
new year with a public affirmation of friendship between the two leaders, in stark 
contrast to the clashes of the last year. As Lukashenka summed up quite neatly, 
"The main result of last year is that we managed to preserve the Union. We did 
not give up any ground." (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 21 Jan 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-
0121, via World News Connection) 
Overshadowing all other topics discussed at the summit was the introduction of 
the Russian ruble as a single currency in the Union State as of 1 January 2005; 
both presidents demanded faster progress toward monetary union.  
 
Belarus is planning to begin use of the Russian ruble along with the Belarusian 
ruble in non-cash transactions as early as 1 July 2003, while the Belarusian ruble 
will be pegged to the Russian ruble at the beginning of 2004. Although the 
meeting primarily reaffirmed agreements that were already known, the 
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atmosphere nevertheless has taken a distinct turn. Previously Belarus had urged 
on the process far more strongly; now President Putin is throwing his weight 
behind the achievement of monetary union, which would also entail some 
propping up of the Belarusian economy by Russia. Minsk, on the other hand, is 
showing more caution and voicing doubts. Belarus National Bank Chairman 
Pyotr Prakapovich stated on 23 January that the Belarusian rubles would not be 
destroyed when the Russian ruble is introduced but rather stored at the National 
Bank: "A wise manager never destroys anything, he keeps it in storage." 
(RFE/RL POLAND, BELARUS, AND UKRAINE REPORT, 28 Jan 03) 
 
Belarus would have to undergo quite drastic reform in order to align itself to the 
Russian ruble zone. So far it appears hesitant to step too far along that path, as 
there is still great unwillingness to sacrifice Belarusian sovereignty in the course 
of this project. Hence, the question of a central bank and single currency, the 
most volatile of the issues involved, remains unsolved. Given these limitations, 
perhaps relations between Minsk and Moscow are not as rosy as the beginning 
of this year seemed to indicate. 
 
MOLDOVA 
To leave (the Transdniestr), or not to leave? What was the question again? 
It has taken less than a month for the faint, yet discernable, prospects for 
substantive progress in the Transdniestr settlement to lapse from cautiously 
optimistic, to business as usual. The newly (albeit repetitively) renewed OSCE 
agreement for the removal of Russian ammunition and troops from the disputed 
region already has fallen prey to a "web" of orders and counter-orders 
accompanied by more doubletalk than might be encountered during a United 
Nations Security Council meeting. 
 
The 2003 spinning of the "web" began with Deputy Commander-in-Chief 
Lieutenant General Valery Yevnevich, who flatly dismissed the "rumors of 
withdrawal" of Russian troops from the Transdniestr as "groundless," less than a 
 24 
week after 28 rail cars full of Russian equipment had departed the region for 
Russia. (THE NIS OBSERVED, 22 Jan 03) (Translation: "rumor" = fact)  
 
A few weeks later the "web" expanded in both depth and intricacy through an 
announcement by Major General Boris Sergeev. On 21 January Sergeev, the 
commander of the operational group of Russian troops in the Transdniestr, 
denied that he had received instructions to "suspend the liquidation of the 
Russian military presence in the Dniestr region for six months." (BASAPRESS, 
21 Jan 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0122, via World News Connection) (Translation: 
"suspend the liquidation" = continue) 
 
In a subsequent report, the Russian news agency reported that the head of the 
General Staff of the Russian Army, Anatoly Kvashnin, had "suspended an earlier 
decision to liquidate the Operation Group" (in the Transdniestr). Kvashnin further 
explained that "this new decision had been caused by a lack of a diplomatic 
solution on the withdrawal of Russian troops and munitions from the region." 
(BASAPRESS, 21 Jan 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0122, via World News Connection) 
(Translation: "suspended" = disregarded; "lack of diplomatic solution" = OSCE 
agreement) 
 
The source providing Kvashnin's comments went on to add that the commander 
of Russian troops in the Transdniestr had been informed "on time." 
(BASAPRESS, 21 Jan 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0122, via World News Connection) 
(Translation: "on time" = not at all)  
 
As might be expected, Sergeev responded that he "had not received orders in 
this regard, and that the duties of Russian troops in the Transdniestr region had 
not undergone any changes yet." (BASAPRESS, 21 Jan 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-
0122, via World News Connection) (Translation: "I am not all that concerned 
about the OSCE agreement, or for that matter 'guidance' from Moscow. I kind of 
like it down here.") 
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Officials of the Transdniestr foreign ministry provided a final, but no less 
significant, layer to the "web" in their confirmation that an order from Moscow 
calling for "suspension of the decision to terminate Russian military presence in 
the region" did in fact exist. (BASAPRESS, 21 Jan 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0122, via 
World News Connection) 
 
The precise role of the approximately 2,500 Russian "peacekeepers" stationed in 
the Transdniestr remains murky. However, Moscow's desire to maintain a military 
presence in the region remains crystally clear, regardless of commitments to the 
OSCE. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
Nord-Ost terrorists were in RF detention? 
Yuri Shchekochikhin, a Duma deputy and deputy editor of Novaya gazeta, wrote 
in the 20 January issue that one of the female terrorists who took part in the 23 
October 2002Nord-Ost hostage-taking, had been held in Russian detention. Her 
mother recognized her on television and said that she could not understand how 
her daughter could have gone from a Russian camp to Dubrovka. (NOVAYA 
GAZETA, 20 Jan 03) 
 
In a similar story, Ann Nivat reports that Movsar Baraev had been detained by 
the military intelligence, GRU, some months earlier and that other members of 
the terrorist unit were arrested in September: "Personal statements that I have 
collected make clear that, two months before the hostage-taking, the GRU... had 
announced Baraev's arrest. The implication is that he would have been held until 
his "release" to lead the hostage-taking at the Dubrovka theatre. At Assinovsski, 
a village close to the border with Ingushetia, which is where two of the unit's 
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women came from, their mothers say that they had been arrested and taken to 
an unknown destination at the end of September." (www.crimesofwar.org, 6 Jan 
03) 
 
Nivat is one of the most experienced Western journalists covering Chechnya. Her 
reporting is based on months of living in wartime Chechnya. She is also the 
Moscow-based correspondent for the Le Nouvel Observateur and author of the 
book, Chienne de Guerre: A Woman Reporter Behind the Lines of War in 
Chechnya. 
 
Armitage in Moscow 
In a 23 January interview with Ekho Moskvy radio, US Deputy Secretary of State 
Richard Armitage made several comments pertaining to the Caucasus and 
Chechnya. He indicated that the State Department is considering placing three 
Chechen groups on its list of terrorist organizations. He declined to give further 
details, saying that this is a legally complicated matter and one in which the 
government has to be careful to weigh concerns about terrorism against the 
human rights of the Chechen population as a whole. (WWW.ECHO.MSK.RU) 
Indeed his reluctance to identify specific groups may stem from the fact that there 
do not seem to be stable formations that can be penalized without branding the 
entire Chechen resistance as "terrorist." In the aftermath of the Nord-Ost 
hostage-taking in Moscow, the Russian government has sought aggressively the 
extradition of Akhmad Zakaev, President Aslan Maskhadov 's representative in 
Europe. However, Moscow has not requested the extradition from Qatar of the 
radical ideologue, Movladi Udugov. It was Udugov who first identified the leader 
of the hostage-takers, Movsar Baraev, to the press by calling the Moscow office 
of the BBC. He did so at roughly 9 p.m. on 23 October, before any other specific 
information had appeared in the media. (ITAR-TASS, 2158 GMT, 23 October 02; 
BBC Monitoring, via Lexis-Nexis) 
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Later in the interview, Secretary Armitage was asked about the US government's 
position regarding possible Russian strikes against Chechens in Georgia. 
Armitage is cited as responding that "a state that believes in preventive strikes 
would have difficulty criticizing the position you describe." However, he also 
indicated that the preferred policy for the US is to train Georgian units so that 
they may conduct counter-terrorism operations on their own. Unfortunately 
Armitage did not elaborate on US President George W. Bush's letter to President 
Eduard Shevardnadze, in which, according to the Georgian media, the US 
president responded positively to Georgian entreaties to include the US in the 
security dialogue currently underway between Moscow and Tbilisi. According to 
the Kavkasia Press news agency, the US president had sent a letter of 
encouragement to President Shevardnadze, which praised the accomplishments 
of the US effort to train and equip Georgian soldiers and complimented the 
Georgians on their policing of the Pankisi Gorge. (KAVKASIA-PRESS, 1319 
GMT, 21 Jan 03; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
According to Civil Georgia, President Bush voiced support for free and fair 
elections and a peaceful transfer of power. (WWW.CIVIL.GE, 22 Jan 03) 
 
UN Security Council Resolution on Abkhazia 
On 30 January the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1462 authorizing the 
continued presence of the UN Observer Mission in Abkhazia, Georgia (UNOMIG) 
until 31 July. (WWW.UN.ORG) The function of the UNOMIG is to observe the 
Russian "peacekeeping" force in Abkhazia. However, Georgian officials presently 
are debating whether the mandate of the Russian peacekeepers will be renewed. 
The Security Council's action preempts the decision of the Georgian authorities 
and is highly inappropriate. The Georgian delegation was not even permitted to 
address the UN Security Council session. (RUSTAVI-2 TV, 1100 GMT, 31 Jan 
03; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
On 29 January, at the CIS summit in Kyiv, President Shevardnadze had vetoed a 
motion to extend the mandate of the peacekeepers, and had indicated that 
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Georgia would agree to extend the mandate only if certain conditions were met. 
Shevardnadze said that he and President Putin had reached an agreement that 
the train traffic to Abkhazia would stop and that Georgian refugees would be 
allowed to return. (GEORGIAN TELEVISION, 0600 GMT, 29 Jan 03; BBC 
Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
On 26 January, the Georgian Security Council had passed a resolution 
specifying the conditions on which the Russian peacekeepers would be permitted 
to remain: If they expanded the zone of their activities to the Gali region; if the 
Russian authorities stopped issuing Russian passports to the Abkhaz; and if train 
traffic between Sochi and Sukhumi were halted. (KAVKASIA-PRESS, 1318 GMT, 
26 Jan 03; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) The Georgian 
position indicates that the mandate would be extended if Russia began to treat 
Georgia in an evenhanded manner. The UN resolution undermines this effort, 
which can only encourage Russia's hawks and make an armed conflict between 
Russia and Georgia more likely. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By David Montgomery 
 
The Kyrgyz referendum: placating the opposition? 
The leaders of Central Asia share a desire for controlling opposition and doing so 
with a semi-democratic pretext. Increasingly, the hold onto power is being 
manipulated in the guise of the language of "democracy," though the Central 
Asian use of the term retains an interpretive fluidity. 
 
Turkmenistan has the reputation of having taken the most totalitarian approach to 
suppressing political opposition, but even President-for-life Saparmurat Niyazov 
has promised citizens that there will be presidential elections between 2008 and 
2010. Of course Niyazov will oversee the elections and maintain a strong (if not 
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total) voice in the decision-making process as a member of the People's Council. 
(ITAR-TASS, 0550 GMT, 23 Jan 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0123, via World News 
Connection) 
 
Uzbekistan started cracking down on the two viable opposition parties, Birlik and 
Erk, in the early 1990s. Both parties faced intense persecution and arbitrary 
arrests; eventually the leaders of the parties fled the country. In April 2002, 
however, President Islam Karimov announced himself open to the possibility of 
opposition parties that worked peacefully within the system. (EURASIANET, 27 
Jan 03; via www.eurasianet.org) While these changes have been influenced 
largely by the close post-September 11 relationship with the US, widespread 
civic participation is not officially encouraged and Karimov retains a firm control 
over the country. 
 
Kyrgyzstan, however, has long been praised for being the closest thing to a 
democracy in Central Asia. Kyrgyz President Askar Akaev was portrayed by 
Western media as a darling of democracy, and he has proved most adept at 
manipulating democracy in a way that is politically beneficial. If anything, the 
recent referendum shows a savvy and sophisticated way of dealing with political 
opposition - allowing citizens to vote for change before they understand the vote, 
thus increasing the persistence of the status quo over change. 
 
THE KYRGYZ REFERENDUM FOR CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 
In the wake of the mid-March 2002 Aksy riots and the numerous protests that 
ensued, Akaev announced in August of 2002 the formation of a 40-member 
Constitutional Council charged with amending the constitution. The drafted 
amendments were to redistribute the division of power between the president 
and parliament and, according to Akaev, "the adoption of the new constitution will 
strengthen our leadership in the transformation to democracy." (EURASIANET, 
18 Jan 03; via www.eurasianet.org)  
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Initially, the process of constitutional revision as conducted by the Constitutional 
Council was praised for its openness to oppositional views and its transparency. 
Some viewed the working draft as a work that embraced the process necessary 
for incorporating the concerns of the opposition; however, in late-January a 
special Akaev-appointed commission made modifications to the constitution that 
many members from the original Constitutional Council did not support. 
(EURASIANET, 30 Jan 03; via www.eurasianet.org) 
 
While the original changes to the constitution involve more than 100 
amendments, the referendum placed before the people on 2 February 2003 
consisted of two "Yes" or "No" questions: 1) Should the law of the Kyrgyz 
Republic "On a new version of the constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic" be 
adopted?; and 2) Should Askar Akaev remain president of the Kyrgyz Republic 
until December 2005 [the constitutional end of his current term] in order to 
implement the approved constitutional amendments? (EURASIANET, 18 Jan 03; 
via www.eurasianet.org) 
 
A survey conducted shortly before the referendum indicated that the 
amendments would be approved, although 64 percent of those questioned did 
not know what the amendments entailed. (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 2 Feb 03) Even 
Cholpon Baekova, chairwoman of the Constitutional Court, expressed concern 
about the proposed amendments and argued that a minimum of six months was 
necessary for experts to review the amendments adequately. (EURASIANET, 18 
Jan 03; via www.eurasianet.org)  
 
The lack of awareness and general absence of public debate about the contents 
of the new constitution have caused concern among US and Western democracy 
organizations such as the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the OSCE 
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). At issue was the 
short period between the announcement of the referendum and the referendum 
itself - a mere two weeks. US State Department spokesman Richard Boucher 
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said that the early vote date would "not permit adequate time for public 
discussion of the government's draft constitutional amendments... [and] the draft 
also contains a number of provisions that fall short of international standards and 
would further concentrate power in the presidency and weaken the role of civil 
society." (REUTERS, 29 Jan 03; via www.reuters.com) In its official statement on 
the constitutional reform process, NDI commented that "recent developments 
have undermined a genuine constitutional reform process." (NDI, 23 Jan 03; via 
www.ndi.org) OSCE ODIHR expressed its concern "that such short notice 
between the announcement and the referendum appears inadequate" and urged 
that the referendum be postponed. (OSCE, 24 Jan 03; via www.osce.org) 
Furthermore, OSCE ODIHR declined to send election observers to monitor the 
referendum. 
 
The timing of the vote has been a point of protest for the political opposition as 
well, who view it as an attempt by Akaev to circumvent meaningful change and to 
further his hold on power. Akaev responded by presenting himself as one who 
has yielded to the concerns of the opposition: "The radical opposition demanded 
my resignation... now that I myself have put a second question on the 
referendum, on whether the country's population has confidence in the president 
to the time his term expires, the opposition has again become unhappy." 
(INTERFAX, 1520 GMT, 27 Jan 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0127, via World News 
Connection) 
 
The argument as continued by Akaev is that the new constitution, in replacing the 
bicameral parliament with a single chamber, would distribute power more 
equitably. Also, by putting his presidency to the vote, he can offer an effective 
retort to opposition calls for his resignation. But the short period before the vote 
left everyone with few choices. As Sergei Likhoman, a 45-year-old geologist, 
noted in voting on 2 February, "I see no other alternative besides Akaev." (AP, 
0536 ET, 2 Feb 03; via www.eurasianet.org) That, in some ways, is the point of 
the inclusion of Akaev's name on the second referendum question. The president 
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is using a democratic procedure to strengthen his control of power before the 
public can effectively debate the constitutional amendments and before the 
opposition can formulate an alternative to his control of power. 
 
Preliminary results from the Kyrgyz Central Electoral Commission claim an 86.3 
percent voter turnout, with 75.5 percent supporting the new constitution and 78.8 
percent supporting the Akaev presidency. (INTERFAX, 1422 GMT, 3 Feb 03; via 
www.interfax.com) Nonetheless, opposition leaders are contesting the results, 
claiming that less than the required 50+ percent of the population voted. 
(INTERFAX, 0801 GMT, 3 Feb 03; via www.interfax.com) Official results will be 
released on 5 February, but it is unlikely to shut up the opposition that has 
viewed the entire process as a democratic farce. 
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